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Advertising is employed to influence consumer decision-making by informing, 
persuading and reminding. Legal persuasive advertising is referred to as puffery 
(praise for a product by means of subjective opinions, superlatives, or exaggerations, 
vaguely and generally stating no specific facts). This article addresses the question 
whether, considering the legal, regulatory and potential welfare losses perspective, 
puffery in South Africa should not be banned. The article concludes that outlawing 
puffery would harm the self-regulating nature of the marketing industry in South 
Africa. It is suggested that firms re-visit their ethical standards and policies; re-
commit to the societal marketing paradigm and all it entails, and re-align to the 
spirit of creativity and the Advertising Standards Authority Code of Practice. 
Verban opgeblase reklame in Suid-Afrika? ’n Interdissi-
plinêre ondersoek
Reklame word benut om verbruikerbesluitneming te beïnvloed deur in te lig, te 
oorreed en te herinner. Daar word na wettige oorredende reklame verwys as “puffery” 
(lof vir ’n produk deur middel van subjektiewe opinies, superlatiewe of oordrywings, 
wat vaagweg en in die algemeen geen spesifieke feite stel nie). Gegewe die wetlike, 
regulerende en moontlike welsynsverliesperspektiewe, spreek die artikel die vraag 
aan of “puffery” in Suid-Afrika nie verban moet word nie. Die artikel kom tot die 
gevolgtrekking dat die verbanning van “puffery” die selfregulerende aard van die 
bemarkingsindustrie in Suid-Afrika sal skend. Daar word aanbeveel dat onder-
nemings hul etiese standaarde en beleid heroorweeg; hul opnuut toewy aan die 
sosiale bemarkingsvoorbeeld, en hul opnuut belyn met die gees van kreatiwiteit en 
die Raad op Reklame-Standaarde se Praktykskode.
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In an effort to influence consumer choice and achieve marketing objectives, firms make use of a variety of marketing communica-tion mix elements, including approaches such as public relations, 
personal selling, sales promotion and advertising (Lamb et al 2008: 
294-322). Over the years, advertising has profoundly influenced the 
lives of consumers. Since its first appearance in the seventeenth cen-
tury as printed advertisements in newsbooks, through many eras (for 
example, industrialisation, depression, creative revolution, designer 
period, and so on) to the present age of consumer empowerment, 
branded entertainment and the E-revolution (O’Guin et al 2009: 74-
107), advertising has been employed to achieve numerous intermedi-
ate (for example consumer beliefs, attitudes, and so on) and behav-
ioural (for example, purchasing, behaviour, brand choice, and so on) 
effects (Vakratsas & Ambler 1999: 26-34). Some argue that in the 
process of achieving desired behavioural effects (for example, purchas-
ing products that are not really needed) advertising claims are often 
exaggerated, misleading and untruthful (Lamb et al 2008: 294-322). 
The question arises whether the legality of certain types of advertising, 
that make themselves guilty of exaggerated, misleading and untruth-
ful claims and messages, should not be reconsidered within the South 
African context, due to the potential of these claims and messages to 
impair consumer decision-making. This article explores the nature 
of advertising and its relation to the concept of puffery/puffing. The 
latter is treated legally and the legal redress for welfare losses due to 
puffing is analysed. This is followed by a discussion of the regulation of 
advertising in South Africa. Insights are provided about the potential 
economic losses due to puffery/puffing before a conclusion is drawn. 
1. Advertising and consumer decision-making
Advertising as marketing communication mix element boasts vari-
ous unique characteristics. As a mode of communication it is indi-
rect and impersonal; it provides little feedback that is frequently de-
layed; the message flow is often one-way, and the communicator has 
little control over the situation in which the advertising is viewed. 
In addition, the advertising sponsor is usually identified in the mes-
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sage, the advertising creator has control over the message, and a large 
audience can be reached fairly rapidly with a standardised message. 
In general, advertising has been described as any form of paid 
communication in which the sponsor or firm is identified (Lamb 
et al 2008: 296) or as a “paid, mass-mediated attempt to persuade” 
(O’Guinn et al 2009: 689). Cronje et al (2000: 218) defined advertis-
ing as the process of informing, persuading and reminding the con-
sumer and also related the nature of advertising to the goals and tasks 
of marketing communications in general, as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: Examples of marketing communications tasks
Informative Persuasive Reminder
Increase awareness of 
new brand or product 
class
Inform market of new 
product attributes 
Suggest new uses for 
product
Reduce consumer 
anxieties
Tell the market of a 
price change
Describe available 
services
Correct false 
impressions
Explain how the prod-
uct works
Build a firm’s image
Build brand preference
Encouragingebrand 
switching
Change consumers’ 
perceptions of product 
attributes
Influence customers to 
purchase now
Remind customers 
that the product may 
be needed in the near 
future
Remind consum-
ers where to buy the 
product
Keep the product in 
consumers’ minds dur-
ing off-peak times
Maintain consumer 
awareness
Source: Adapted from Lamb et al (2008: 294-322, 324-354).
Reminder advertising is used to keep the product and brand 
name in the public’s mind, to trigger consumer memory and to 
maintain consumer awareness. Informational advertising is described 
as “inform ation that goes to the consumer and genuinely adds to his 
knowledge of what is available” (Shepherd 1999: 111). This type of 
advertising seeks to provide information on product characteristics 
(cf Ferguson & Ferguson 1994), to convert an existing need into a 
want, or to stimulate interest in a new product. In South Africa, 
informational advertising is viewed as a legal offer to the consumer 
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to do business on the strength of information given by the advertise-
ment (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 80). Beggs et al (1984: 213) describe 
persuasive advertising as informing the customer of genuine or per-
ceived product differences in order to increase brand loyalty, whether 
the product differences are real or not. This type of advertising is 
aimed at stimulating consumer behaviour (for example, purchas-
ing, and so on) or consumer action (for example, drinking more of 
a particular soft drink or using more of a certain laundry detergent) 
(Lamb et al 2008). According to Ferguson & Ferguson (1994: 9-11, 
65-75), persuasive advertisements are designed to distort consumer 
behaviour in order to accommodate a higher, profit-maximising 
price. Shepherd (1999: 111) describes persuasive advertising as an 
attempt “to change consumers’ preferences because it interferes with 
the exercise of innate preferences, it alters choices away from the ef-
ficient lines that ‘consumer sovereignty’ would yield”. It is said that 
advertising in general uses emotional appeals to shift the viewer’s fo-
cus away from facts and that viewers who fail to make the distinction 
between provable claims and pleasant but meaningless word-play 
ultimately purchase an idea at a high price instead of purchasing ac-
tual benefits (Jennings 2004: 1) An understanding of the consumer 
decision-making process provides insight into the potential impact 
of advertising, in general, and persuasive advertising, in particular.
The consumer decision-making process is complex, involves 
mul tiple stages and has been constructed by researchers in a variety 
of model formats, often of a linear nature (Blythe 2008: 1-30, 249-
59). Lee (1990: 6) suggests that the reason for the sequential nature 
of traditional consumer decision process models relates to the long-
standing assumption that “consumers are rational decision-makers 
who have the ability or skills to go through a sequential decision-
making process to reach an optimal choice among alternatives” (Lee 
1990: 6). The models were most often based on economic theory, con-
firming Lee’s premise that consumers act rationally with the purpose 
of maximising satisfaction in their purchase of goods and services 
(Schiffman & Kanuk 2000). According to Lee (1990: 1-10), in most 
consumer-decision-making models five similar stages (first intro-
duced by John Dewey in the early part of the twentieth century) can 
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be distinguished, namely problem recognition, information search, 
evaluation of alternatives, purchase, and post-purchase behaviour. 
Blythe (2008: 259) highlights the excessive rationality of the Dewey 
model and argues that “life is simply too busy to spend much time 
agonizing over which brand of biscuit to buy”. This emphasises the 
existence of different types of decision-making with varying levels 
(routine, limited, extensive) of associated consumer effort and in-
volvement (Lamb et al 2008: 66-98). Researchers have expanded the 
model to indicate the factors that influence the five-stage consumer 
decision process (cf Schiffman & Kanuk 2000). These factors include 
individual aspects (perception, motivation, learning, values, beliefs, 
attitudes, personality, self-concept, lifestyle) and social aspects (cul-
ture, reference groups, opinions, leaders, family, social class). These 
are all potentially influenced by marketing mix elements such as the 
product or service itself, pricing, distribution, physical evidence (for 
example, facilities, store layout, and so on), processes, people and 
promotion, of which advertising forms part. It is obvious that adver-
tising has the ability to influence consumer choice directly through 
the consumer’s own perceptions, attitudes, and so on and indirectly 
through social interactions and groups. 
2. The concept of puffery (“puffing”)
According to Kamins & Marks (1987: 6-15), consumers have viewed 
a considerable amount of puffery in advertising claims over the years. 
Puffery is an approach often used by marketers in advertising and 
sales to enhance their products and boost product awareness among 
consumers. In general, the roots of puffery are traced back to the 
sixteenth century and, despite the consumerism movement of the 
twentieth century, the majority of the puffery approach remains una-
bated (Butod 2009: 1).
Wells et al (2003: 30-45) have defined puffery as advertising or 
other forms of sales representations that praise the item that will be 
sold by means of subjective opinions, superlatives, or exaggerations, 
vaguely and generally stating no specific facts. Clow & Baack (2010: 
35-45) state that puffery exists “when a firm makes an exaggerated 
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statement about its goods or services”. Black’s Law dictionary defines 
puffery as an expression of opinion by selling not made as a representa-
tion of fact. It adds that puffery can include exaggeration by a salesper-
son concerning the quality of goods (not considered a legally binding 
promise) and that the concept usually concerns opinions rather than 
facts (Winston & Winston 1998: 8). Examples of puffery include slo-
gans such as “Nestles makes the very best chocolate” (Kamins & Marks 
1987: 6); “Snapple – made from the best stuff on earth, Wheaties is the 
‘breakfast of champions’, Kellogg’s “brings the best to you each morn-
ing” (Gourley 1999:10), and general claims such as “the finest foods”, 
“the best smelling perfume” (Winston 1998: 8) or “a day without 
orange juice is like a day without sunshine” (Gourley 1999:10). 
In South Africa the advertising industry is self-regulated by the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). The Code of Practice of the 
ASA describes puffery as “value judgments, matters of opinion or 
subjective assessments” that are “permissible provided that it is clear 
what is being expressed is an opinion and there is no likelihood of the 
opinion or the way it is expressed, misleading consumers about any 
aspect of a product or service which is capable of being objectively 
assessed in the light of generally accepted standards. In general, the 
guiding principle is that puffery is “true when an expression of opin-
ion, but false when viewed as an expression of fact” (ASA 2006). The 
puffery definition adopted by the ASA is linked to what constitutes 
the difference between puffery and a mere advertising claim. Clow & 
Baack (2010: 35-45) quote the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of 
the USA who is responsible for regulating most advertising in that 
country. The FTC states that the critical difference between puffery 
and an advertising claim is that puffery is generally not considered 
to be a factual statement, whereas a claim is usually considered to be 
a factual statement that can be proven true or false. In general, a re-
presentation of fact or an objective claim that ties a tangible quality 
to something that can be measured or identified cannot be viewed as 
puffery. If an advertising claim can be the subject of substantiation 
by means of testing or measurement with the aim of proving the 
truth of the claim, the claim cannot be described as puffery and false 
claims then become a misrepresentation of fact (Winston 1998: 8).
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According to Wells et al (2003: 30-45) research about puffery 
and its effectiveness has generated mixed empirical results. Some 
findings suggest that the public might expect that advertisers are 
able to prove the truth of their superlative claims. Other studies 
indicate that generally reasonable people do not believe superlative 
claims. In 1987 Kamins & Marks (1987: 6-15) compiled an insight-
ful overview on studies related to puffery. Table 2 provides a sum-
mary of their work. 
Table 2: Overview of puffery research
Researcher(s) Study Findings
R. H. Bruskin 
Associates
Consumers review 17 
puffed advertising 
claims.
69.5% of consumers 
believed the puffed 
statements to be partly or 
completely true.
Cunningham and 
Cunningham 
Survey of 2 200 consum-
ers in medium-sized 
Texas city.
More than 30% of sample 
either agreed or were un-
certain whether a product 
advertised as the best is/
was indeed superior to 
competition.  
Olson and Dover Manipulation of subjects’ 
expectations of product 
performance through 
advertising containing 
false claims.
64% of subjects de-
veloped strong beliefs 
regarding the advertised 
claim; those exposed to 
the communication were 
more likely to believe 
the claim than a control 
group who tasted the 
product in the absence of 
advertising exposure.
Holbrook Exposure of subjects to 
alternative forms of an 
advertisement, one ver-
sion making six factual 
claims and the second 
presenting the claims in 
puffery form.
Only one statistical dif-
ference in the strength of 
product attribute beliefs 
between the ad forms and 
therefore limited statisti-
cal support for the notion 
that puffery statements 
are believed to a lesser 
degree than facts.
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Researcher(s) Study Findings
Rotfeld and 
Rotzou
Observed puffery claims 
in a set of five commer-
cials communicated to 
more than 80% of the 
sample.
The claims were noted 
as being true by nearly 
half of the subjects who 
perceived the claims. 
Wyckham Studied puffing advertis-
ing claims which imply 
brand superiority, used 
four claims which varied 
across product categories. 
25% of the sample 
believed the slogans, 
55% misinterpreted 
advertising slogans as 
indicating the advertised 
brand was better than the 
competition.
Source: Adapted from Kamins & Marks (1987)
In addition to providing an overview of research results about 
puffery, Kamins & Marks (1987: 7) analysed the impact of using 
two-sided claims on product attitude and purchase intention. Their 
findings suggested that consumers are generally not deceived by 
high levels of puffery in a one-sided form when provided with the 
opportunity of product trial. However, they appear to be more sus-
ceptible to deception when communication is of a two-sided refuta-
tional form. According to Kamins & Marks (1987: 7),
a two-sided appeal typically presents the product in a positive fash-
ion on attributes which are salient or important to brand choice, but 
disclaims or limits product or brand performance claims on some 
attributes which are of relatively minor significance to the con-
sumer [whereas in a] refutational form, the product’s weaknesses or 
its limitations are refuted in the context of the communication.
The findings in Table 2 and from the Kamins & Marks (1987: 
6-15) study cast doubt over the position of the FTC that puffery can-
not lead to deception and indicate that puffery can indeed present 
claims that are frequently believed.
3. A legal and regulatory perspective on puffery 
(‘puffing’)
An overview of legal aspects related to puffery, contractual obliga-
tions due to puffery and the regulation of the method in South Africa 
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in particular, provides further insights into the influence of the ap-
proach within the marketing and consumer environment. 
3.1 A legal view on puffery
In South Africa informational advertising is viewed as a legal offer 
to the consumer to do business on the strength of information given 
by the advertisement (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 80). On the other 
hand, persuasive advertising (“puffing”) is viewed as a legal invita-
tion to do business and is not regarded as an offer by the advertiser 
(Van der Merwe et al 2000: 80). Such an invitation to do business 
(“puffing”) is only legal when the “reasonable consumer” is not mis-
led by representations of praise and commendation made during 
the course of negotiations in order to persuade the consumer to do 
business (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 80). If the “reasonable con-
sumer” is misled by such representations it is deemed to go beyond 
“mere praise and commendation” and the invitation to do business 
is deemed misleading and therefore illegal. Advertisers are therefore 
deemed to be “bluffing” (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 80).
In general, the following criteria could be used to determine 
whether an advertisement goes “beyond mere praise and commenda-
tion”: statements which are not illegal though they cannot be proven 
to be true (Preston 1975: x); statements that are so vague or hyper-
bolic that a reasonable person would take it neither literally nor 
seriously (Bergerson 1995: 15); generalised, exaggerated, vague or 
subjective statements that a reasonable person would not interpret 
as a factual claim upon which s/he could rely (Edelstein 2003: 2); an 
expression of the seller’s opinion only (Richards 1990: 19).
In the USA the principal statute regulating most advertising is 
section G of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, which states 
that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices [...] are hereby declared 
unlawful” (Honigwachs 1987: 157). What is unfair or deceptive 
is for the FTC and for the courts, which review its actions, to de-
termine. In addition, many states have statutes that also prohibit 
deception in advertising. Many have accepted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) (or parts thereof) which also deals with puffing 
(Preston 1997: 336).
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The following criteria have often been used by the courts and the 
FTC to distinguish between puffing statements in advertisements 
and objective claims: whether the statement is general or specific, 
with general statements more likely to be puffing; whether the state-
ment is capable of measurement, with non-measurable statements 
more likely to be considered puffing, and whether the statement is 
couched in terms of fact or opinion, with opinion statements more 
likely to be considered puffing. Examples of the types of statements 
which constitute puffing include “The Ultimate Driving Machine” 
for BMW automobiles; “Nobody Does It Like We Do” for McDon-
ald’s, and “You Can Travel the World Over and Never Find a Better 
Beer” for G Heileman Brewing Company (Edelstein 2003: 2).
The UCC also names
… a number of factors relevant to whether a buyer is reasonable 
in believing that an express warranty rather than ‘puffing’ is in-
volved. For example the buyer might be unreasonable if the seller’s 
representations taken in context were verbal rather than written, 
general rather than specific, related to the consequences of buying 
rather than the goods themselves, ‘hedged’ in some way, related 
to experimental rather than standard goods, concerned some as-
pects of the goods but not a hidden or unexpected non-conformity, 
phrased in terms of opinion rather than fact, or not capable of ob-
jective measurement (Preston 1997: 336).
Legal writers have strongly criticised the puffing doctrine. Pres-
ton (1975: 298) is of the opinion that, in the light of the modern 
legal trend towards consumerism, the “puffing” defence should be 
abolished. He mentions a “... growing recognition that puffing is 
probably deceptive …” and agrees with recommendations that the 
FTC apply the same substantiation requirements to “puffing” that 
it applies to other claims.
Honigwachs (1987: 160-1) notes that there is a clearly perceived 
trend away from the acceptance of “puffing” as a defence except in the 
most trivial of circumstances. He considers the law with regard to 
the “puffing” defence as ambiguous and uncertain. Pitofsky (1977: 
677), a former Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the 
FTC, considers “puffing” acceptable only when it is of the type that is 
clearly not to be believed. Richards (1990: 39) is of the opinion that 
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“the evidence [...] suggests many claims labeled puffing by the Com-
mission and the courts convey factual implications” adding that “... 
it is arguable that many of these claims make explicit factual claims.” 
With reference to the (free) market he states that there is a concern in 
“the law of the marketplace [...] involving the treatment of opinions. 
It involves the existence of puffing ...”.
In South Africa welfare losses due to misleading advertisements 
can usually only be compensated by approaching the courts. How-
ever, it appears that the majority of consumers never approach the 
courts because they are unaware that they were/are being misled and 
that their capacity to make rational choices among competing goods 
has been impaired. Consumers often seem to lack the funds to take 
legal action and/or often do not trust the judicial system to provide 
a satisfactory outcome. The main concern of this article is therefore 
whether consumers should, to a greater extent, be protected from 
puffery advertisements. 
3.2 Contractual obligations due to puffery 
According to the (common) law of contract in South Africa, advertis-
ing is legal and can only be regarded as wrongful if it is contrary to 
the norm or standard of acceptable conduct in a particular society. 
Inter alia this means that the misrepresented must in fact have been 
misled and that due to the misrepresentation he suffered welfare 
losses (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 78). Such a consumer can claim 
damages from the advertiser on the grounds of a breach of contract.
In order to decide whether a contract exists, one should first seek 
consensus among the parties (Christie 1996: 21). This means that 
there must be an offer by one party followed by an unconditional 
acceptance of that offer by the other. With regard to advertising it 
is important to establish whether statements made in an advertise-
ment may be construed as offers capable of acceptance, thus present-
ing the advertiser with a binding contract (Woker 1999: 50). In 
Crawley v Rex1 it was held that the specific advertisement (a placard 
outside a shop stating the price per pound of a certain brand of to-
1 1909 RA 1105.
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bacco for sale) was merely “an announcement of his intention to sell” 
and not an offer.2
Notwithstanding the Crawley decision there is no inflexible rule 
that declarations contained in advertisements can never amount to 
offers (Woker 1999: 51). If the nature of an advertisement, its word-
ing, or the surrounding circumstances, make it clear that it is in-
tended to be an offer, the court will treat it as such (Sharrock 2002: 
61).3 A misleading advertisement may also affect the validity of any 
transaction which the trader and customer subsequently conclude. 
It may result in the transaction being void for misrepresentation or 
for lack of consensus (Sharrock 2002: 61).
In Phame (Pty) Ltd vs Paizes4 Judge of Appeal Holmes states that:
Whether a statement by the seller goes beyond mere praise or com-
mendation will depend on the circumstances of each case. Relevant 
considerations could include the following: whether the statement 
was made in answer to a question from the buyer; its materiality to 
the known purpose for which the buyer was interested in purchas-
ing; whether the statement was one of fact or personal opinion; and 
whether it would be obvious even to the gullible that the seller 
was merely singing the praises of his wares, as sellers have ever 
been wont to do.
In an earlier decision, Carlill vs Carbolic Smoke Ball Company,5 it 
was established that an offer made in an advertisement could consti-
tute part of a contract. This decision is still regarded as good law and 
serves as a warning to advertisers in the wider context of advertising 
claims in general. Ultimately, the intention of the parties is of para-
mount importance in deciding whether or not the advertisement 
constitutes a binding offer.
As mentioned earlier, if the advertisement is deemed to be an 
offer, a consumer who has accepted the offer and suffers losses due to 
such a misleading advertisement can claim damages from the adver-
tiser on the grounds of a breach of contract.
2 At1108.
3 Cf also Bloom vs American Swiss Watch Co 1915 AD 100.
4 1973(3) SA397 (A) at 418.
5 (1893) 1 QB (CA).
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Thus, according to South African law, advertisements that “puff” 
do not constitute an offer and therefore no contract comes into exist-
ence. If a consumer was misled and s/he perceived the advertisement 
not as “puffing” but as a legal offer, it is his/her responsibility to 
prove that the advertiser intended to make an offer and is therefore 
in breach of contract.
In the remote possibility that an advertiser’s intention can be de-
termined as an offer in a court, the benefits of that, regarding consumer 
welfare, will be minimal. South African consumers seldom6 approach 
the court regarding misleading advertisements. A win for one or two 
consumers in a court will not stop advertisers from “puffing”.
3.3 Regulating puffery in South Africa
The advertising industry in South Africa voluntarily formed the Ad-
vertising Standards Authority (ASA) in 1969 and adopted the Code 
of Advertising Practice (the Code). Although the ASA is an inde-
pendent body, the Code has received statutory backing when the In-
dependent Broadcasting Authority Act7 accepted it as the standard 
to which all broadcast advertising in South Africa must conform, re-
gardless of ASA membership. The Harmful Business Practices Act8 
afforded similar statutory backing.
As far as “general principles” are concerned, the Code states that 
advertisements should not be framed so as to abuse the trust of con-
sumers or exploit their lack of experience, knowledge, or credulity.9 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,10 
which deals with fundamental rights, is of special importance for the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) in South Africa. Section 1611 
deals with “Freedom of expression” which inter alia includes “freedom 
6 An indication of this is the dates of the locus classica still cited in our law on this 
topic: Carlill vs Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893)1 QB (CA) and Crawley 
vs Rex (1909) TS 1105.
7 Act 153 of 1993.
8 Act 71 of 1988.
9 Section 11, clause 2.
10 Act 108 of 1996.
11 Part of Chapter 2 of Act 108 of 1996.
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of the press and other media”12 and “freedom to receive and import 
information or ideas”.13 Freedom of expression is obviously not an 
absolute right and the Constitution makes provision for limitations 
to such (and other) rights. In S vs Makwanyane14 the Constitutional 
Court stated that a determination of whether a limitation is reasonable 
and necessary involves the weighing up of competing values.15
The ASA must also take note of statutes affecting “puffing” in 
South Africa. The advertising industry in South Africa pre-empted 
legislative intervention by forming the ASA. This has resulted in 
relatively lenient advertising laws, and the authorities prefer to leave 
the regulation of advertising to the industry (Woker 1999: 36).
Numerous statutes regulate certain types of advertisements re-
ferring to specific situations and professions. The Harmful Business 
Practices Act16 mentioned earlier could be considered dealing with 
“puffing”, although not referring to it by that name. This Act pro-
vides for the prohibition of certain business practices that may be 
regarded as “harmful to consumers”. A harmful business practice 
is defined as “any business practice which [...] has the effect of [...] 
deceiving any consumer”.17 The Act provides for the establishment 
of a Business Practices Committee with the power to investigate 
business practices and to recommend that they be declared harmful. 
There is close co-operation between this Committee and the ASA 
in the field of advertising (Woker 1999: 47). The Committee has 
drafted its own Consumer Code for Advertising based on the ASA 
Code. It states that complaints about advertising must be addressed 
to the ASA which remains the main body for ensuring that advertis-
ing serves the public interest (Woker 1999: 47).
The question can be asked whether or not the ASA’s Code of 
Advertising Practice provides redress for losses due to unacceptable 
advertising. The ASA has at its disposal three forms of sanctions, 
12 Subsection 1(a).
13 Subsection 1(b).
14 1995(b) BCLR 665(c).
15 At 708.
16 Act 70 of 1988.
17 Section 1.
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namely the withdrawal of advertising privileges, an ASA pre-clear-
ance requirement, and adverse publicity (Cf De Jager & Smith 1995: 
12).
It is clear that the Code provides for “punishment” and “harass-
ment” of advertisers who do not co-operate, but not for the redress of 
losses suffered by the consumer. Any consumer can of course lodge 
a complaint with the ASA regarding unacceptable advertisements. 
However, this hardly ever occurs for the following apparent reasons: 
consumers might not be aware that they are being misled; consum-
ers might be ignorant of their rights (or even of the existence of the 
ASA); it might not be in the nature of South African consumers to 
stand up for their rights; by complaining one can do no more than 
prevent further losses, since actual losses are too difficult to recover.
Whatever the reasons might be, consumers will have to seek re-
lief in the courts, which rarely happens. Should they go that far, it 
will seemingly still be difficult to prove actual losses (which might 
also be a reason for not “going to court” in the first place).
6. Evaluating losses due to puffery
In analysing the possible losses by the consumer due to advertising 
and puffery, a number of aspects are considered. The lack of market 
knowledge in “the real world” is extensive (Cowan & Crampton 
2002: 5, Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2001: 294, Reekie 1989: 228). The 
mainstream neoclassical view that consumers, firms and resource 
owners should have perfect knowledge of the relevant economic 
and technological data; that labourers and owners of capital must 
be aware of how much their resources will bring in all possible uses; 
that firms must know the price of all inputs and the characteristics 
of all relevant technologies; and that consumers must be aware of 
all prices, is regarded as too extreme and unattainable and therefore 
rejected (Shepherd 1999: 38).
The Austrian School encourages economic agents to collect in-
formation and to use it effectively because “anything which prevents 
innovation and change is undesirable” (Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 
10). Although information and knowledge should not be used syno-
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nymously due to their different meanings, more information adds to 
more knowledge which should increase the rationality of consumers 
and utility (Cowan & Crampton 2002: 5). The Austrian approach 
mentioned earlier further holds that, although most markets are suf-
ficiently robust to function efficiently under conditions of imperfect 
knowledge, more knowledge is better than less knowledge, because 
it increases consumer rationality. Most sales efforts mix information 
and persuasion (Shepherd 1999: 111). Advertisements judged by 
ASA to be dominantly informational, due to among others their out-
lay and wording, can be regarded as playing a valuable role in adding 
to the knowledge of consumers regarding rival goods and services in 
the marketplace. Consumer welfare losses in concentrated markets 
could to a certain extent be alleviated by informational advertising 
(Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 72-3). The more information consum-
ers have regarding rival products in the market, the more rational 
their choice-making becomes, thus increasing their welfare. Frank 
(2003: 459) states that when a firm informs the consumer regarding 
the attributes of its product through advertising, the firm’s demand 
curve positively shifts to the right for two reasons: first, people who 
have never used that type of product learn about it, therefore chang-
ing their taste and preferences and leading some to buy it. Secondly, 
other people who already consume a different brand of the same 
product may switch brands because of advertising. The total market 
for the industry’s product thus increases and it could therefore be 
argued that advertising had a positive influence. Beggs et al (1984: 
213) are of the opinion that the first reason is difficult to criticise and 
could be accepted. Gwartney et al (2000: 506) hold the same view. 
The second reason represents an approach of merely redistributing 
existing sales among firms (Frank 2003: 459). Mansfield (1994: 387) 
suggests that both cases seemingly result in selling more at the same 
price and therefore suggests a positive parallel rightward movement 
of the demand curve. 
Ferguson & Ferguson (1994: 73) are of the opinion that informa-
tional advertising could decrease market prices in concentrated mar-
kets and thus enhance the welfare of consumers. In discussing the 
positive effects of advertising, Mansfield (1994: 345) and Ferguson 
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& Ferguson (1994: 73) also mention the possibility of advertising 
increasing the price elasticity as well as the cross-elasticity of de-
mand. Mansfield (1994: 345) states: “To the extent that it provides 
trustworthy information to consumers about product quality and 
other matters, its effect may be positive”. Shepherd (1979: 367) re-
gards informational advertising as being socially beneficial up to the 
point at which marginal social benefits equal its costs, as it adds to 
the knowledge of the consumer of what is available: “This improves 
competition and consumer choice, so that preferences can take effect 
more thoroughly.”
The majority of writers in the field of economics seem to agree 
that a rightward move of the demand curve, as a result of an adver-
tisement, could also have a negative effect on consumers. According 
to Sloman (1995: 75), advertisers in general try to shift the product 
demand curve to the right as well as make it less price elastic. They 
will therefore be able to increase both sales and price. Ferguson & 
Ferguson (1994: 70-2) view advertisements that result in price in-
creases as “persuasive”. If producers advertise in such a manner as to 
deliberately misinform consumers by for instance “puffery”, market 
efficiency is undermined and therefore undesirable. It seems that, 
although markets are sufficiently robust to function efficiently with 
imperfect information and despite criticism to its true relevance (cf 
Cowan & Taylor 2002), the economics of asymmetric information 
is forcefully brought into play if consumers are deliberately being 
misled, because the producers’ knowledge regarding the product 
quality is enhanced vis à vis the consumer (with the resultant misal-
location of scarce resources). 
Advertisements judged to be predominantly persuasive by the 
ASA, due to among others their outlay and wording, can be linked to 
product differentiation. Beggs et al (1984: 213) are also of the opinion 
that persuasive advertising attempts to increase brand loyalty in con-
centrated markets. Caves (1992: 21) is more cynical and comments as 
follows regarding money spent on any kind of advertisement:
If a seller spends money on advertising, then it is very likely that it 
sells a differentiated product. This holds true almost by definition, 
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since an undifferentiated product is one whose consumers cannot 
perceive any difference among brands.
Samuelson (1976: 485-7) views product differentiation as the deli-
berate breaking-up of the market demand curve (should this theo-
retical world ever exist in practice) in order to suit the profit-seeking 
activities of firms. An industry or groups of firms are imperfectly 
competitive when each firm faces its own demand curve which is not 
horizontal. They therefore have some measure of control over price. 
Mansfield further argues that the total market for the industry’s 
product may not increase in response to the increased advertising. 
The effect on the sales of individual firms may be so small that the 
benefits of the advertisement may be cancelled out by cost increases. 
Such advertisements could also raise the production costs of the en-
tire industry “since one firm’s advertising campaign causes other 
firms to increase their advertising” (Mansfield 1994: 387).
Shepherd (1999: 111-2) clearly states that persuasive advertising 
is “largely a form of economic waste”. Persuasive advertising impairs 
rational choice-making which , in turn, is tied to inefficiencies in 
production and detrimental to consumer welfare. Consumer welfare 
will be lessened because consumers are paying more for a product 
than they would have if markets were more competitive: “[c]onse-
quently, it must be associated with higher profit-maximising prices” 
(Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 71). Shepherd (1999: 112) estimates 
that the USA could be loosing at least 70 billion dollars annually 
to this kind of advertising. However, he also states that persuasive 
advertising might have some social value if it helps a new competitor 
into the market (Shepherd 1979 : 367).
As market concentration increases, persuasive advertising is ex-
pected to increase across the monopolistic competitive and oligopoly 
range and decrease as it moves closer to the monopolistic range, the 
so-called inverted-U hypothesis (Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 67). 
Shepherd (1999: 288) clearly states that selling expenses flourish in 
the monopolistic competition and oligopoly range, because it is a 
“safer” method of competition than price-cutting, a view also held 
by Mansfield (1994: 339). Shepherd (1979 : 368) concludes that per-
suasion will be at its highest when products are identical; the con-
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sumer has weak preferences because he lacks education or product 
experience, and facts are unfavourable to the seller. Firms operating 
in these markets are not price-takers, but price-makers. The firm sets 
the price while choosing the quantity to supply. Imperfect markets 
therefore do not have a market supply curve (Pindyck & Rubinfeld 
2001: 335, Mankiw 2004: 323).
According to Sloman (1995: 262) and Ferguson & Ferguson 
(1994: 62), there is no point in advertising under perfect competi-
tion since knowledge is perfect and products homogeneous. Sloman 
(1995: 262) also sees little point for a monopolist to advertise since 
by definition there are no competing rivals. Information regarding 
his/her product could be gained from retailers and/or wholesalers. 
Consumers could also make “search” enquiries regarding product at-
tributes (Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 65). On the other hand, Shep-
herd (1999: 288) views a limited role advertisements could play for 
a monopolist, perhaps it could be used to reduce demand elasticity 
so as to raise the amount of profits taken in.
According to Hayek (1961: 1-3), although persuasive advertis-
ing is seen to be economically wasteful, they are not convinced that 
such advertisements also create wants as was suggested by Galbraith 
(1984: 145-50), therefore imposing more serious costs on the con-
sumer and society in general. They accept the argument that as socie-
ties develop and expand, so do their needs and their fulfilment.
Finally, Shepherd & Shepherd (2004: 13) clearly state that wel-
fare losses are much more prominent under tight oligopoly conditions 
than under conditions of loose oligopoly and monopolistic competi-
tion which they classify under “effective competition”. According to 
Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2001: 227), any inefficiency in monopolistic 
competitive markets must be balanced against the benefit of prod-
uct diversity. They state that the gains from product diversity can 
be large and may outweigh the inefficiency costs resulting from im-
perfect markets. The efficiency consequences of mere “puffery” could 
therefore be more severe for countries with high concentration ratios 
than for countries with lower ones. The highly concentrated industrial 
sector in South Africa (Fourie 1996: 97-121) creates the suspicion that 
welfare losses in South Africa, due to product differentiation, could be 
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in the tight oligopoly range rather than in the loose oligopoly and/or 
monopolistic competitive ranges. Shepherd & Shepherd (2004: 13) 
define a tight oligopoly as a market where the four leading firms have 
a combined market share of over 60%. Mere “puffery” could help to 
sustain inefficiencies in production by increasing barriers to entry, 
thus annulling welfare gains due to product diversification. It should 
also be remembered that exploitative actions by any South African 
producer that effect consumers adversely are forbidden by law. In addi-
tion to legal action that could be taken by the Competition Commis-
sion to decrease barriers to entry and increase competitiveness in such 
markets, competitiveness in these markets could also be improved by 
exposing the consumer to advertisements that inform rather than mis-
lead. Lipsey (1993: 280) views informational advertising as playing an 
important part in the efficient operation of any free market system by 
decreasing barriers to entry. 
7. Conclusions and recommendations
Informational advertising is said to appeal more to the rationality 
of consumers whereas persuasive advertising (“puffery”) appeals to 
the irrational side (Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 71). Persuasive ad-
vertisements in South Africa are regarded as legal if it is deemed to 
be “puffery” (Van der Merwe et al 2000: 78) and if the reasonable 
consumer is not misled. However, research and the arguments in 
this article indicate that puffery has the ability to adversely influ-
ence even the reasonable consumer. “Puffery” thrives on imperfect 
knowledge in the market and it seems that such advertisements can 
impair consumers’ (who already lack market information) rational 
choice-making, therefore adding to production inefficiencies and 
welfare losses (Ferguson & Ferguson 1994: 71). 
Due to the above-mentioned focus on the irrational side of the 
consumer and the possibility that puffery can impair consumer deci-
sion-making, some researchers and practitioners argue that puffery 
should be banned in South Africa unless the advertisement is worded 
in such a manner that the chances of deception are minimal. It is 
argued that the practice will continue unabatedly until such time 
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that it is outlawed by parliament or suppressed by other means such 
as the Advertising Standards Authority. Preston (1975: 209) states 
that he finds it
... appropriate to insist that any forms of material misrepresenta-
tion, if they are not presented to the public specifically as false, no 
matter how obviously false they may be, should be banned from 
the marketplace as deceptive.
However, Woker (1999: 61) mentions that “whether or not legis-
lation is the solution to the problem of misleading advertising is a 
difficult issue as “even stringent legislation is meaningless unless it 
is effectively enforced”. The current challenges related to enforcing 
various laws in South Africa raise the question whether criminalising 
“puffery” would be a practical solution. It appears that large firms 
could continue using puffery, knowing that the chances of being 
prosecuted are remote and, in the (unlikely) event of legal action, the 
result could most probably be high levels of free publicity. Preston 
(1975: 16) summarises this as follows: “[Puffery is] used because it 
works, [and is] legalised because it doesn’t.”
The idea of banning persuasive puffery advertisements appears 
to be problematic for a number of reasons. First, it seems to be dif-
ficult to always distinguish precisely between an informational and a 
persuasive advertisement. Some advertisements seem to incorporate 
both informational and persuasive elements in an attempt to influ-
ence consumer behaviour and to ultimately satisfy consumer and 
business needs (Lamb et al 2008: 294-322).
Secondly, the consumer’s irrational side is seemingly connected 
to his/her emotion, which is an important part of the process of cre-
ating and managing a brand. Brands are aimed at being need-satis-
fying entities as they, among others, enable the consumer to make 
better decisions by differentiating between different levels of qual-
ity and associated need-satisfaction. The newest developments in 
brand management focus on paradigms such as “lovemarks” (Rob-
erts 2005) and “relational brand management” where emotion is 
critical for creating relationships with consumers, brand personali-
ties and brand loyalty towards brands. Therefore, the removal of all 
irrational, often emotion-based, advertisements might not be the 
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answer to the regulation of puffing as it will hamper the creation of 
successful brands (Roberts 2005: 1-60).
Thirdly, the postulation that consumers are rational decision-
makers and buyers is based on the economic buyer theory, and one 
could therefore debate the relevance of the statement. In the economic 
buyer theory it is assumed that consumers, within reason, know all 
the facts. Currently, however, the numerous marketing messages that 
reach the consumer daily and that are supposed to provide all the facts 
can become so overwhelming that consumers struggle to process and 
are basically never equipped with all the facts. It is also supposed that 
consumers logically compare alternative choices in terms of values 
and cost. Consumers indeed compare alternatives. However, these are 
not all the available options, but rather the alternatives selectively in-
cluded in the consumer’s evoked set and based on criteria subjectively 
selected by the consumer based on existing knowledge and relevant 
preferences (Schiffman & Kanuk 2000: 54). In addition, the number 
of available alternatives is often too vast to consider all the options. 
Therefore, the logical comparison of all the alternatives seems impos-
sible. Finally, in terms of the economic buyer theory, consumers have 
limited resources and therefore pursue maximum satisfaction at the 
lowest cost (Lamb et al 2008: 3-34), often basing their decisions on 
information that is readily available due to the advertising (informa-
tional and/or persuasive) efforts of the firm. 
Despite the problems related to outlawing puffery advertising, it 
is acknowledged that there is an increasing uneasiness about “puff-
ery” in the US, one of the more efficient economies of the world. The 
question again arises: how should puffery be dealt with in a country 
such as South Africa where economic and legal systems are regarded 
as sophisticated, but the majority of consumers are not. How should 
advertising be managed in a country where many consumers are still 
illiterate and thus not always informed about the difference between 
“puffery” and “truth”?
According to Davidson (1994: 14), marketers must exercise some 
restraint and be able to distinguish between light-hearted puffery 
and cynical deception. If not, government regulators might impose 
constraints that marketers are unwilling to adopt themselves. The 
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following recommendations are made. It is suggested that the regu-
lating authority of the ASA be protected and that advertising in 
South Africa remains in a self-regulated context. It is suggested that 
both large and small firms be encouraged to reconsider their market-
ing paradigm, as this paradigm will dictate the nature and approach 
of a firm’s advertising. A return to the societal marketing paradigm 
is suggested. The societal marketing paradigm arose in the late 
1960s and early 1970s as an acknowledgement that a business exists 
not only to meet business objectives and satisfy consumer needs, but 
also to conserve or improve individuals’ and society’s long-term best 
interests (Lamb et al 2008: 3-34). The societal marketing concept 
exerts that marketing must serve the goals of business and society 
beyond profit generation (Lazer 1969: 3-9, Kotler & Levy 1969: 
10-15). Lazer (1969: 9) stated that “there need be no wide chasm 
between the profit motive and social responsibility, between corpo-
rate marketing objectives and social goals, between marketing ac-
tions and public welfare”, but that the firm’s marketing orientation 
should extend to the acknowledgement of the societal dimensions 
of marketing and that it is more than just another firm technology. 
Advertising that falls within the societal marketing paradigm will 
focus on creating shareholder and social value and will therefore re-
frain from deliberately adopting approaches that communicate mis-
leading and untruthful messages (Daw 2006: 1-20).
According to Wells et al (2003: 30-45), due to the fact that obvi-
ously exaggerated puffery claims are legal, the question of puffery 
is mainly an ethical one. Researchers argue that consumers expect 
exaggeration and inflated claims in advertising and therefore rea-
sonable people will not believe that puffery statements are literal 
facts. Although it is generally agreed that deception in advertising 
is unacceptable, determining what is deceptive from both an ethical 
and regulatory standpoint remains a challenge. However, it remains 
the responsibility of the firm to conduct ethical business practices, 
including marketing and advertising, and to treat consumers ethi-
cally. The basic question related to puffery is still whether the act or 
the practice is likely to affect the consumer’s behaviour or decisions 
with regard to a product or service. If so, the practice is material, and 
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consumer injury is likely because consumers are likely to have chosen 
differently if not for the deception (O’Guinn et al 2009: 689-700). It 
is recommended that firms be encouraged by bodies such as the ASA 
to revisit their ethics and to deliberately commit to ethical practices 
in the process of wooing consumers. Instead of regulating the in-
dustry to such an extent that creativity is stifled, it is suggested that 
the ASA takes on a much broader, pro-active role in which they en-
courage marketers and advertisers to increase their levels of respon-
sibility, refrain from untruthful, deceptive advertising approaches, 
and rather opt for creative work that leaves consumers with greater 
knowledge. Historically, the FTC ruled persuasive puffery adver-
tisements to be non-deceptive in nature and regarded as an approach 
that can provide consumers with greater knowledge and entertain-
ment. It has the ability to fulfil the role of informing the consumer 
and increasing brand awareness (Butod 2009). 
Researchers suggest that marketers should always ask themselves 
whether their messages can be objectively analysed. If so, it is a claim 
and must be fully capable of substantiation. Even if they appear to 
be puffery, if they have been defined in the body copy, they will be 
judged against that definition. Therefore the recommendation to 
marketers is: if in doubt seek advice that will enable advertising 
which, by nature, adheres to the societal marketing paradigm (Pres-
ton 1997: 336-44, Lazer: 1969: 3-9).
In conclusion, perhaps the challenge in South Africa is not to 
over-regulate the advertising industry by increasing legislation and 
banning puffery advertisements. Firms should rather be encouraged 
to renew their commitment to the general spirit of the ASA as stipu-
lated in the preamble to the Code of Practice: all advertisements 
should be legal, decent, honest and truthful; all advertisements 
should be prepared with a sense of responsibility to the consumer; 
all advertisements should conform to the principles of fair competi-
tion in business; and no advertisement should bring advertising into 
disrepute or reduce confidence in advertising as a service to industry 
and to the public. 
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